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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS' TORT LIABILITY*

Kenneth Culp Davist
law on tort liability of public officers and employees is
much more interesting than one might expect on the basis of
abstract contemplation. The traditional common-law notion that
an employee should, as against the employer, bear the ultimate
responsibility for his negligence has been exposed as seriously
unrealistic in a holding by a unanimous Supreme Court; the
decision concerning the government employee is potentially applicable to corporate employees. The many holdings that officers
are not liable for deliberate and malicious torts are based on the
intriguing view that justice cannot be done when malice is proved,
without opening the door to unjustified charges that conscientious
officers have acted maliciously. Settled law that police officers
are personally liable for false arrest and related torts is in process
of becoming unsettled, under the leadership of the California
Supreme Court, and the reasons in favor of a basic change see_m
impressive. The law of torts involving excess of jurisdiction is
still trying to rid itself of an unsound push given it by Justice
Holmes in 1891, and to some extent it is succeeding. Especially
fascinating is the rise and partial decline, during the decade from
1944 to 1954, of a literal interpretation of an 1871 federal statute,
the Civil Rights Act. The present study reaches the somewhat
surprising conclusion that some of the principal points made
by Professor Jennings, in an excellent 1937 article1 which has
been widely influential, are out of line with the case law, and that
these pai:ticular aspects of the case law are probably sound.

C

ASE

l.

THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF OFFICERS' IMMUNITY

The central principle that takes care of the great bulk of practical problems concerning tort liability of public officers and
public employees is that officers are generally immune from liability for their unintentional fault in the exercise of discretionary
functions. · Federal law in support of this principle is firm and
• This article is a companion to another on a closely related subject, "Tort Liability
_of Governmental Units," 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1956). Professor Allan H. McCoid of the
University of Minnesota Law School has made helpful suggestions about this article,
which are gratefully acknowledged.
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; A.B. 1931, Whitman College, LL.B. 1934,
Harvard; author of text on Administrative Law (1951).-Ed.
1 See note 152 infra.
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clear, and most of the state law is equally so, although many state
cases still seem to cling to the view that was once dominant that
officers should be liable for their fault even when they are exercising discretion. By and large, the present law is the antithesis of
Dicey' s proposition that "every official, from the Prime Minister
down to
constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same
responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any
other citizen. " 2 Indeed, one may doubt whether English courts
at any time would have held the Prime Minister liable personally
on account of exercise of discretionary power.
The background for the law conferring immunity upon administrative officers exercising discretionary powers is the law
concerning immunity of judges. The Supreme Court early held:
"It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convic•
tions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
. . . The principle ... obtains in all countries where there is any
well-ordered system of jurisprudence.''3 The doctrine has been
rigorously applied in recent times with the explanation that "The
purpose of the rule which exempts public officers from the harassment of private suits for damages on account of the performance
of their public duties, is, secondarily, for their protection, in order
that its primary objective may be secured, i.e., a fearless administration of the law.'' 4 The rule applies equally to inferior judges
and even to justices of the peace.5 Occasional liability has been

a

2 DICEY, THE LAw OF THE CoNsrITUTION, 8th ed., 189 (1915). The "rule of law,"
according to Dicey, "excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty
of obedience to the law which governs other citizens." Id. at 198. But see the preface to
the 9th edition, xvi (1939), by Emlyn C. 5. Wade: Dicey's critics "reject, and I believe
rightly, his conception of the rule of law•.. .'' And at p. xcii: Dicey "seems . . . not
sufficiently to have regarded the immunities which the prerogative rule - the Crown can
do no wrong- afforded, and still largely affords, to Crown servants in this country.''
3 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 at 347 (1872). For especially penetrating
analyses, see Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 MINN. L. R.Ev. 263
(1937); James, "Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers," 22 UNIV. CHI.
L. Rev. 610 (1955). See also Powell, "Administrative Exercise of the Police Power," 24
HARv. L. R.Ev. 441 (19ll); David, "The Tort Liability of Municipal Officers,'' 12 So. CAL.
L. R.Ev. 368 (1939); Keefe, "Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials,'' 12 FoRD.
L. REV. 130 (1943).
4 Booth v. Fletcher, (D.C. Cir. 1938) IOI F. (2d) 676 at 680, cert. den. 307 U.S. 628
(1939). See also Fletcher v. Wheat, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 432, cert. den. 307 U.S.
621 (1939). The principle of judicial immunity is so strong that the Supreme Court has
held that a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was immune from
liability for acting in bad faith even despite the clear implication of a statute providing
immunity for acting in good faith. Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913).
5 Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P. (2d) 242 (1943); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal, 129 Conn. 545, 29 A. (2d) 751 {1943).
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imposed on account of ministerial acts 6 or pursuant to special
statutory provision.7
As early as 1845 the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
judicial immunity to the Postmaster General who was sued for
refusing to make payments to the plaintiffs: "A public officer is
not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act
to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation
to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even
although an individual may suffer by his mistake. A contrary
principle would indeed be pregnant with the greatest mischiefs."8
A half century later the Court held the Postmaster General immune from liability for defamation, uttering one sentence which
forms the foundation for much later law: "[T]he same general
considerations of public policy and convenience which demand
for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil
suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course
of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large
extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon
them by law."9 The Secretary of the Interior accordingly has an
absolute privilege to include malicious defamation in a press
release concerning official business,10 and the Secretary of the
Treasury is not liable for "arbitrary, wanton, capricious, illegal,
malicious, oppressive, and contemptuous" action.11
Federal courts have held that the immunity similarly applies
to the Attorney General, members of a parole board, a parole
executive, a warden, and a director of prisons; 12 to the Comptroller
6 De Courcey v. Cox, 94 Cal. 665, 30 P. 95 (1892); Stensrud v. Delamater, 56 Mich.
144, 22 N.W. 272 (1885).
A significant and unusual case is Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E. (2d) 257
(1943), holding four to three that a judge is liable for defamation by acting with malice
in delivering opinions to unofficial publishers for publication in the New York Supplement
and the New York Law Journal. But the court declared (at p. 56) that "even if those
opinions had been written with knowledge of their falsity and with actual intent to injure
the plaintiff, the defendant, in accord with the well-established public policy, would be
exempt from liability for 'composing' the opinions."
7 The statute is the Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1981 to
1984, discussed in Part VI below.
s Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87 at 98 (1845).
9 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 at 498 (1896).
10 Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) II7 F. (2d) 273, cerL den. 311 U.S. 718 (1941). See
note, 33 Iu.. L. R.Ev. 358 (1938).
11 Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 557, cerL den.
293 U.S. 605 (1934).
12 Lang v. Wood, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 2ll, cert. den. 302 U.S. 686 (1937). In
Gregoire v. Biddle (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579, cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 (1950), two
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' of the Currency and his deputies, a United States attorney and
his assistant,. the general counsel for the division of insolvent banks
of the Treasury Department, and a special agent for the FBI;13
to the members of the SEC; 14 to members of a draft board;15 to
the President's confidential assistant, a special assistant to the
Attorney General, a director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons· and
a warden of a· federal penitentiary;16 to a prosecuting attorney;17
to a bankruptcy conciliation commissioner;18 and to a director of
an alien enemy control unit and a district director of immigration;19 to immigration officials, including an immigration inspector;20 to a psychiatrist in a federal prison; 21 and to members of a
Milwaukee town board, including a building inspector, a health
officer, an attorney, and a plumbing inspector.22
Possibly the most doubtful decision is the application of the
immunity to one denominated "a Special Agent of the- [Federal]
Bureau of Investigation." 23 The court recognized "a general rule
that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good
faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the
immunity of the sovereign,"24 and it acknowledged that "Even
police, detectives and investigators . . . are generally not trained
for participation in judicial determinations; and are sometimes
apt to. be come oppressive in administration of their duties, unless
kept under close restraint by prosecutors and judges...." 25 But
the court nevertheless held the FBI agent immune: "When the
act done occurs in the course of official duty of the person duly
appointed and required to act, it is the official action of the department; and the same reason for immunity applies as if it had been
attorneys general, two directors of the Enemy Control Unit, and the district director of
immigration at Ellis Island were held not liable for damages for allegedly malicious action
in arresting and holding the plaintiff as an enemy alien.

13 Cooper v.

O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135.
v. Kennedy, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. den. 314 U.S. 665 (1941).
The case also held that counsel in the employ of the government could properly defend
the officers. On this question, see annotation, 130 A.L.R. 736 (1941).
15 Gibson v. Reynolds, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 95, cert. den. 337 U.S. 925 (1949).
16 Laughlin v. Rosenman, (D.C. Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 838.
17 Yaselli v. Goff, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, affd. 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
18 Adair v. Bank of America Nat. Trust Se Savings Assn., 303 U. S. 350 (1938).
19 Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579, cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
20 Papagianakis v. The Samos, (4th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 257, cert. den. 341 U.S.
921 (1951).
21 Taylor v. Glotfelty, (6th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 51.
22 Baker v. Mueller, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 180.
23 Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135.
24Id. ·at 137.
- 25 Id.
141.
14 Jones

at
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performed by the superior officer himself.'' 26 Another federal
court has later observed that "In only one case does it appear that
an agent of the FBI was accorded such immunity," and denied a
motion to dismiss a complaint against the agent. 27
Recent state cases seem usually to hold that officers who exercise discretionary functions are immune from liability for their
negligence or for other unintentional tort. Thus, an attorney
general who wrote a letter to plaintiff's superior, demanding that
plaintiff be dismissed as an assistant district attorney because of
alleged communist associations, was held immune, even though
the letter was released to the newspapers. 28 Village officers are
immune from liability for revoking a liquor license.20 A state fish
and game warden is held not liable for failing to furnish blanks
to one previously selected to sell licenses.30 Members of a hospital
board are not liable for ·wrongful discharge of employees.31 An
investigator of the California Fish and Game Commission is immune from liability for malicious prosecution.32 Other officers
are similarly held immune.33
Recent state decisions imposing liability are exceptional and
usually rest on special reasons. One of the most startling is a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals34 that a complaint
seeking damages from election officials for refusing to place the
plaintiff's name on the ballot was sufficient to state a cause of
action. The court acknowledged the existence of "a line of cases
holding that public officers with entirely different duties are not
liable for damages, at the suit of a citizen, for making nonmalicious
26 Id. at 142.
27 Kozlowski v. Ferrara, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 117 F. Supp. 650
28 Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. (2d) 892 (1952).

at 652.
A dissenting judge argued
mainly that the attorney general was acting outside the scope of bis authority.
20 Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill. App. 197, 59 N.E. (2d) 499 (1945). The principle, quoted
(at p. 209) from another case, was said to be that "officers exercising . • • judicial powers
.•. 'are exempt from liability for error or mistake of judgment in the exercise of their
duty in the absence of corrupt or malicious motives.' "
30 Meinecke v. McFarland, 122 Mont. 515, 206 P. (2d) 1012 (1949). The case bas
special strength as an authority for immunity because the fact came out that the officer
was bonded: "The liability of the surety cannot exceed that of bis principal.'' Id. at 522.
81 Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 193 P. (2d) 461 (1948). The court made a good
statement of the reason for the immunity (at p. 202): "The doctrine of immunity ••.
is for the benefit of all to whom it applies, that they may be free to act in the exercise
of honest judgment, uninfluenced by fear of consequences personal to themselves."
32 White v. Towers, 37 Cal. (2d) 727, 235 P. (2d) 209 (1951). Three of the seven
judges dissented.
83 Trum v. Town of Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 109 N.E. (2d) 116 (1952) (road commissioner not liable for failing to cut brush along public way); Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn.
Supp. 167, 110 A. (2d) 635 (1954) (state commissioner of motor vehicles not liable for
negligently registering car having no safety glass).
·
S4 Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E. (2d) 68 (1952).
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and nonfraudulent mistakes adversely affecting that citizen's rights
or interests."35 It disposed of that line of cases by holding: "But
a different public policy operates as to election officials. . . . . For at
least two centuries the courts in jurisdictions with representative
forms of government have given most special protection to a citizen's right to vote ... and, correlatively, his right to be a candidate.
36
• • •"
The case can also be explained as not involving a discretionary function, for the court said that, "the board's power to determine the validity of a nominating petition 'extends only to
ministerial examination'.... " 37 Still another possible way to explain the case is by emphasizing that the court said: "Surely, this
amended complaint accuses defendants of more than a mere goodfaith mistake."38
When a surety or insurance company is the real defendant,
courts may find the imposition of liability easier. Such a case may
be no more significant than a case in which a truck driver is held
liable for his negligence, where his company carries liability insurance covering the accident. For instance, that a dog catcher was
held liable for failing to catch a rabid dog may be easily explained
by the fact that an insurance company was a co-defendant.39

IL

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR MINISTERIAL

AcTS

Somewhere a line supposedly separates the performance of
judicial, legislative, executive, and other "discretionary" functions
from manual, clerical and other "ministerial" work. The officer
who exercises what the courts call discretionary power is immune
from tort liability, but the public employee whose tasks are regarded as ministerial is liable.
Even if an attorney general acts maliciously, he is immune,
But even if the truck driver is guilty of nothing more serious than
the kind of momentary human misjudgment that is common to
all drivers, he is personally liable.
The reasons for immunity of officers exercising discretionary
35 Id. at 482.
86 Ibid.
37 Id. at 480.
38 Id. at 482.

In Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189 (1944), officers
were held liable for failing to place a name on a ballot. The duty was regarded as ministerial, and bonding companies were co-defendants.
39 Serpas v. Margiotta, (La. App. 1952) 59 S. (2d) 492. A surety is liable for discharge of a deputy sheriff's shotgun at plaintiff's car, even though the surety is the State
of Nevada. Hill v. Thomas, 70 Nev. 389, 270 P. (2d) 179 (1954). A constable and his
sureties have been held liable for false imprisonment, even where the constable's action
seemed quite reasonable. Ingles v. Hotze, 191 Okla. 378, 130 P. (2d) 302 (1942).
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power are impressive and probably sound, as we have seen. The
provocative question, on which the law may be in process of basic
change, is whether the immunity should attach to the employee
who commits an unintentional tort in the performance of ministerial functions. This question is becoming more important than
it used to be, for the increased incomes of this class of workers
mean that they are less often judgment-proof. We have reason to
inquire whether the common-law tradition is quite at variance
with the realities.
Judicial opinions may say,40 the Restatement may provide,41
and most lawyers may assume that employees are legally liable for
their unintentional wrongs. But the plain facts of business are
otherwise. When the typical corporation is held vicariously liable
for an employee's negligence, the corporation does not seek indemnity from the employee, whatever may be its theoretical legal
right to indemnity. If the typical corporation were to do so, the
problem would no doubt be quickly taken care of through a collective agreement; the union would force the corporation to protect the employees through insurance (or through self-insurance). The overwhelming judgment of businessmen is that the
enterprise, not the individual employee, should bear the losses that
result from unintentional harms in carrying on business activities. Corporate managements assume this, and they have typically
acted voluntarily in obtaining the requisite insurance, protecting
not only the corporation but also its employees. The traditional
notion of the common law that any individual musfbe ultimately
liable for his own wrong has been undercut by the more fundamental principle-apparently felt by businessmen more than by
judges and lawyers-that the enterprise, not the employee, should
assume the responsibility for the natural and normal consequences
of business activity.
40 E.g., Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943): "The liability of an agent
for his own negligence has long been embedded in the law. • • • The principle is an
ancient one and applies even to certain acts of public officers or public instrumentalities."
Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 at 423, 97 P. 875 (1908): "The employee's responsibility is primary. He is responsible because he committed the wrongful or negligent act.
The employer's responsibility is secondary.••• The principal ••. may indemnify himself to the full amount against his agent. These legal propositions ••• receive universal
recognition."
In England, after the employer's insurance company has been held liable on account
of the employee's negligence, the insurance company may recover from the employee.
Romford Ice &: Cold Storage Co. v. Lister, [1955) 3 W.L.R. 631.
41 AGENCY REsrATEMENT §401, comment c (1933): "Unless he has been authorized to
act in the manner in which he acts, the agent who subjects his principal to liability
because of a negligent or other wrongful act is himself subject to liability to the principal
for the loss which results therefrom."

208

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 55

If a governmental unit is the employer, the realities are the
same, except to the extent that the government is an even better
loss spreader than the corporate enterprise. Under the Tort ·claims
Act the government is now liable for most unintentional torts resulting from ministerial work. When the government is liable,
a plaintiff is unlikely to seek recovery from the employee. The
most important practical question is therefore whether or not ~e
government should be entitled to indemnity from the employee
after the government has been held liable for the employee's negligence. Another way to put the question is to ask whether the
loss should be borne by the government, which is best able to
bear it, or by the employee, who is least able to bear it.
A set of hypothetical facts will con,tribute to an appi:.eciation
of the realities. A driver of a mail truck drives ten years before
his first accident. The government is held liable for $5,000. The
driver earns $4,000 a year, has three children in school, but still
has managed to accumulate savings of $5,000. Should the $5,000
be absorbed as a part of the cost of carrying the mail, or should
it come out of the driver's savings? The common-law theory, as
stated by Professor Seavey, is that "indemnity should be granted
under the ordinary rules of restitution because the employee
caused a loss which in equity and good conscience should be paid
by him." 42 The theory is deeply entrenched, and doubtless most
lawyers still believe in the legal principles which have long been
familiar to them. Professor Seavey generalizes that "warm hearts,
even in the breasts of able and conscientious judges, may make
bad law." 43 In this, Professor Seavey is surely right. Warm hearts
may make bad law. But warm hearts may also discover bad law
and correct it. The time may be ripe for judges and lawyers to
catch up with the attitudes of businessmen and of governmental
administrators and to give serious consideration to the question
of whether an enterprise should absorb many or most or all of the
losses that are normal and expected in carrying on its activities.
The governmental practice, as well as the corporate practice,
has been ahead of the legal development. A sample of the governmental reality, as distinguished from the common-law tradition,
is found in Private Law 820, Eighty-second Congress, providing
42

Seavey," 'Liberal Construction' and the Tort Liability of the Federal Government,"

f/1 HARV. L. REv. 994 at 1002 (1954) .
.(3

Id. at 1003.
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for reimbursement of a mail truck driver who had been held liable
to a claimant for negligence in the operation of his truck.44
Another sample of the governmental reality can be found in
a formal opinion of the Attorney General of the United States
in 1941.411 The Secretary of Agriculture asked whether an employee, who had become intoxicated and while driving a government car had had an accident, could be required to reimburse the
government for a payment made to the injured party. The intoxication makes the case a much stronger one for requiring reimbursement than a case of ordinary negligence. The Attorney
General nevertheless ruled that the reimbursement could not be
required. The opinion may go too far, since the employee was
intoxicated. Even so, it is based upon a good deal of experience.
The icfea of employee·reimbursement was "tried out during the
earlier yea:r:s of our national existence. . . . Numerous suits were
filed by private parties against officers and employees of the government and the judgments obtained were sometimes in amounts
so large as to threaten financial ruin and bankruptcy. . . . [T]he
Congress repeatedly came to the relief of the erring officers and
employees. Thus, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2
Cranch 64, 124 [1804], the Supreme Court held Captain Murray,
of the U.S. Frigate Constellation, personally liable for a tortious
seizure, but the Congress made provision for his relief by the act
of January 31, 1805, c. 12, 6 Stat. 56."46 The Attorney General
added: "Of course, the employee may be subjected to suitable
discipline, including dismissal, if warranted."47
Another kind of development showing the temper of the times
is the growing body of state legislation providing that state and
local governmental units may or must indemnify employees who
have been held liable in tort on account of acts within their employment.48
The problem came to the Supreme Court in United States v.
Gilman.49 The single question was whether the government could
recover indemnity from an employee after it had been held liable
44 66 Stat. Al43 (1952). The amount was designated as sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and court costs recovered by the claimant against the driver of the mail truck.
41140 Op. Atty. Gen. 38 (1941).
46Id. at 40.
47Id. at 41.
48 For a discussion of this state legislation, see Davis, "Tort Liability of Governmental
Units," 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 at 764-766 (1956).
49 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
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under the Tort Claims Act for the employee's negligence in driving a government automobile. The Court unanimously held for
the employee. The Tort Claims Act provided only that a judgment against the United States is "a complete bar" 'to any action
by the claimant against the employee.50 The Court found its answer neither in the statute nor in the legislative history, although
in a footnote it did set forth supporting legislative history.51 It
declared that the issue was "a matter on which Congress has not
taken a position. It presents questions of policy on which Congress
has not spoken. " 52
The basis for the Court's decision is thus a general one and
the reasons may be equally or largely applicable to employees of
state and local governments. The Court was unimpressed with the
authority of the common-law principle that a private employer has
a right of indemnity against an employee whose negligence has
made the employer liable. Instead, it recognized: "Here a complex
of relations between federal agencies and their staffs is involved."58
The Court spoke of "Tenure, retirement, discharge, veterans'
preferences, the responsibility of the United States to some employees for negligent acts of other employees," and then it said:
"Discipline of the employee, the exactions which may be made
of him, the merits or demerits he may suffer, the rate of his promotion are of great consequence to those who make government
service their career. The right of the employer to sue the employee
is a form of discipline. . . . Moreover, the suits that would be
brought would haul the employee to court and require him to
find a lawyer, to face his employer's charge, and to submit 'to the
ordeal of a trial. The time out for the trial and its preparation,
plus the out-of-pocket expenses, might well impose on the employee a heavier financial burden than the loss of his seniority or
a demotion in rank. . . . Perhaps the cost in the morale and efficiency of employees would be too high a price to pay for the rule
· d emmty
· . . . ."54
of m
50 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2676.
51347 U.S. 507 at 511-513, n. 2 (1954). Mr. Francis M. Shea, then Assistant Attorney
General, explained the Government's position. The Court quotes long excerpts. The
key sentence is: "If the Government has satisfied a claim which is made on account of a
collision between a truck carrying mail and a private car, that should, in our judgment,
be the end of it." The question was put: "Is there any requirement that [the] employee
-should in any way respond to the Government if it has to pay for the injury, in the
event of gross negligence?" Mr. Shea replied: "Not if he is a Government employee.
Under those circumstances, the remedy is to fire the employee."
·
52 Id. at 511.
SSibid.
54 Id. at 509-510.
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Of course, the Gilman problem cannot properly be considered
without taking into account the prevalence of liability insurance.
The Court did not see fit to state the facts as to the employee's
insurance, even though the government's brief pointed out that
"the practice of the Government has been to restrict such claims,
usually to situations in which the employee at fault is covered by
liability insurance," and quoted the applicable regulation of the
Coast and Geodetic Survey authorizing a requirement that all
employees obtain at their own expense liability insurance for damage incurred while driving government vehicles. The Court said:
"Perhaps the suits which would be instituted under the rule which
petitioner asks would mostly be brought only when the employee
carried insurance. But the decision we could fashion could have
no such limitations, since we deal only with a rule of indemnity
which is utterly independent of any underwriting of the liability."55 The decision is thus an especially strong one, in that it
applies even when the employee is covered by insurance. One
effect of the decision is to relieve government employees of the
payment of premiums to cover accidents in operation of government vehicles.
Perhaps the most doubtful aspect of the Gilman decision relates to the choice the Supreme Court made between judicial and
administrative determination of the question of indemnity. The
common law would in effect leave the question of indemnity to
administrative determination in each case. The Court's decision
foreclosed indemnity even in a case in which special circumstances
call for indemnity.
Perhaps the Gilman case should not control if the employee
was driving while drunk, or if the tort was intentional. Perhaps
the common law should continue in a case like Brady v. Roosevelt
S.S. Co.,56 where the agent operating a vessel on behalf of the
Maritime Commission was a corporation. Special problems will
have to be solved when an officer is bonded, so that the real defendant may be a surety company,57 and care will have to be taken to
avoid upsetting the effectiveness of liability insurance, which may
sometimes be inoperative unless the employee is liable.58 If the
55 Id. at 510.
56 317 U.S. 575
.57 In Rogers v.

(1943) •
The Marshal, 68 U.S. 644 at 650 (1863), a marshal was held liable
for misconduct of his deputy. The suit was against the marshal and the sureties on his
official bond.
58 See note, 34 NEB. L R.Ev. 78 (1954).
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doctrine is to be developed that an enterprise should bear the
losses from unintentional harms that normally grow out of the enterprise, many problems of line-drawing will need to be solved.
An underlying problem will be whether the lines should be drawn
by administrative officers or by courts.
The cases imposing liability upon public employees who perform non-discretionary functions are scarce, probably for the reason that such defendants are seldom financially responsible.59
A superior officer is not liable for the tort of a subordinate
even when the subordinate would be liable for his own tort. 60 But
for directing or participating in a tort of a subordinate a superior
may be liable. 61 Liability may be imposed on the superior for improper performance of a non-delegable duty. 62 And a superior
may be liable for choosing or keeping incompetent or vicious
subordinates. 63
59 The driver of a school bus is liable for his own negligent driving. Hansley v. Tilton,
234 N.C. 3, 65 S.E. (2d) 300 (1951); Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938). A
public school teacher is liable for fault in administering medical treatment to a student.
Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A. (2d) 468 (1942). A physician employed in
a state university infirmary may be liable. Davie v. University of California, 66 Cal. App.
689, 227 P. 247 (1924). A demurrer was held wrongly sustained in a suit for damages by a
pupil against a school superintendent, principal, supervisor, janitor, and members of a
board of education. Whitt v. Reed, (Ky. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 489. A coroner has been
held liable for false arrest and confinement to a mental hospital, even though he acted
in good faith and without malice. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 S. (2d) 87 (1955).
Failing to put a name on a primary election ballot may be ministerial, so that public
employees will be liable. Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E. (2d) 68 (1952);
Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189 (1944).
60 The Supreme Court has explained: "Competent persons could not be found to fill
positions of the kind, if they knew they would be held liable for all the torts and wrongs
committed by a large body of subordinates, in the discharge of duties which it would be
utterly impossible for the superior officer to discharge in person." Robertson v. Sichel,
127 U.S. 507 at 515 (1888). Accord: Armacost v. Conservation Commission, (S.D. W.Va.
1954) 126 F. Supp. 414; Jones v. Kennedy, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. den. 314
U.S. 665 (1941); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Brightman, (8th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 161;
Marshall v. County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal. App. (2d) 812, 281 P. (2d) 544 (1955); Klam
v. Boehm, 72 Idaho 259, 240 P. (2d) 484 (1952); Gray v. Wood, 75 R.I. 123, 64 A. (2d) ~
191 (1949); Reiter v. Illinois Nat. Cas. Co., 397 Ill. 141, 73 N.E. (2d) 412 (1947).
By virtue of statutes, sheriffs are sometimes liable for acts of deputies. Magenheimer
v. State, 120 Ind. 128, 90 N.E. (2d) 813 (1950); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Clark, 136 Tex.
238, 150 S.W. (2d) 79 (1941). The surety bonds in these cases should not be overlooked.
61 Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conn. 435, 109 A. 246 (1920); Nunn v. Turner, 133
Wash. 654, 234 P. 443 (1925). In Rich v. Warren, (6th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 198, an army
major was held liable for injuries caused to a pedestrian when his driver negligently drove
a government car, the theory of liability being the major's acquiescence or encouragement.
62 Chambers v. Anderson, (6th Cir. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 151 (sheriff and deputy); Ulvestad
v. Dolphin, 152 Wash. 580, 278 P. 681 (1929).
63 Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. (2d) 226, 138 P. (2d) 12 (1943), a city manager and
chief of police, and their bondsmen, were held liable for the acts of policemen in beating
up and killing an inmate of a jail.
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LIABILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS FOR FALSE ARREST AND
RELATED TORTS

If, as most judicial opinions seem to assume, a line must be
drawn between discretionary and ministerial functions to determine whether a public officer or employee is immune from liability in tort, what kind of function does an ordinary policeman
perform when he arrests an individual, searches his home or his
pockets, imprisons him, and makes charges against him?
From the standpoint of authority, the question is to some extent an open one, although the common-law tradition unquestionably has been that a policeman is subject to tort liability as if he
were a private individual. A policeman is, of course, privileged
in various circumstances, but the problem of privilege must be
distinguished from the problem of immunity, which arises only if
the officer ·acts beyond his privilege. Thus, the officer has a privilege
to make an arrest upon a warrant which is fair upon its face but
in fact invalid. If the act the officer commits is unprivileged and
tortious, he still may escape liability if he is immune. The immunity is the same for each officer, whether the tort is false arrest,
malicious prosecution, or some other tort, although privilege may
vary with the tort. The question we are here concerned with is
immunity. The old cases uniformly assume that policemen are
not immune from tort liability, 64 and some of the recent ones do.ms
A textwriter says: "Arrest under a warrant, or the levy of civil
process, is considered a 'ministerial act,' for which the officer will
be liable if he acts properly, but will be liable personally if he steps
outside of his authority. . . . He will be liable if he mistakenly
arrests another than the person named, or seizes property not
covered by the writ. " 66 The Restatement of Torts in dealing with
malicious prosecution, for instance, recognizes the immunity for
a "public prosecutor" but not for a "peace officer." 67 But recent
cases in both federal 68 and state69 courts show a substantial inclination to reexamine the common-law tradition.
Brock v. Stimson, 108 Mass. 520 (1871); Hefler v. Hunt, 120 Me. IO, 112 A. 675 (1921).
Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Cal. (2d) 854, 228 P. (2d) 550 (1951); Mason v. Wrightson, 205
Md. 481, 109 A. (2d) 128 (1954).
66 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 107 (1955).
67 Sec. 656 (d) (1938).
68 An FBI agent was held immune in Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F.
(2d) ll!5.
611 E.g., White v. Towers, 37 Cal. (2d) 727, 235 P. (2d) 209 (1951).
64

65
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The problem is not one that can be resolved by inquiring into
the meaning of words. If it were, the solution would be easy: when
a policeman decides a question that may later divide an appellate
court, he must be performing a "discretionary" function. Neither
is the problem one that can be resolved by the over-simplified
idea that an individual who commits a "wrong" must b~ held
legally responsible for making decisions that a later tribunal holds
to be mistaken. The problem is a highly practical one, for abuses
by police officers are so widespread that estimates have been made
that from one million to three and a half million illegal arrests
are made annually,70 and that three-fourths of all arrests are illegal.71 The only sensible approach is to inquire what solution will
most effectively promote our basic objective of developing a fair
and efficient system of law enforcement involving a minimum of
abuses.
If the governmental unit is immune, the reasons for imposing
liability upon the policeman for false arrest or illegal search and
seizure may seem strong, for otherwise the plaintiff may be without remedy. One might initially suppose that the way to minimize
illegal arrests is by providing an effective remedy against the
policeman, a remedy available to a plaintiff who has incentive to
use it. An officer who knows that he will be personally liable will
be careful to avoid false arrests and illegal searches.
But this initial supposition is unsupported by experience.
What happens in fact is that personal liability is so rarely imposed
upon officers that abuses are unchecked,72 and, at the same time,
that in the rare cases in which liability is imposed, the deterrence
may be, or may be thought to be, too strong. If an officer resolves
all doubts in favor of his own pocket book, the public interest in
effective law enforcement is sure to suffer. Courts are usually aware
of this danger. The Michigan court, for instance, has declared that
"a police officer who acts in good faith in the line of duty should
be protected even though overzealous in its discharge. . . . If
possible, any doubt should be resolved in favor of an honest discharge of duty by peace officers, and the courts should not place
them in fear of responding in damages for the lawful and proper
discharge of that duty." 73
70 Hall,

"Police and Law in a Democratic Society," 28 IND. L. J. 133 at 152, 154 (1953).
"Investigating the Law of Arrest," 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940).
72 See Foote, "Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights," 39 MINN.
L REv. 493 (1955), for an excellent account of the ineffectiveness of personal liability of
officers when the plaintiff lacks completely clean hands.
73 Odinetz v. Budds, 315 Mich. 512 at 518, 24 N.W. (2d) 193 (1946).
71 Warner,
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Especially enlightening case law is a line of recent decisions of
the California Supreme Court, beginning with the 1951 decision
in White v. Towers. 74 Earlier the same year the same court in a
suit against policemen for false imprisonment had held that "the
liability of defendant officers depends upon whether they had
reasonable cause for believing that plaintiff was the person guilty of
taking the money." 75 The whole question was one of privilege;
lack of immunity was assumed. But in the White case the court said
that the question was whether the defendant investigator for the
Fish and Game Commission was "immune from civil liability for
the alleged malicious prosecution." The court's reasoning in holding him immune has a good deal of persuasive force: "When the
duty to investigate crime and to institute criminal proceedings is
lodged with any public officer, it is for the best interests of the community as a whole that he be protected from harassment in the
performance of that duty. The efficient functioning of our system
of law enforcement is dependent largely upon the investigation
of crime and the accusation of offenders by properly trained officers.
A breakdown of this system at the investigative or accusatory level
would wreak untold harm. . . . [Defendant] is entitled to the
immunity from civil liability with which the law surrounds officials directly connected with the judicial processes." 76 The court
generalized about the many cases it cited, most of which involved
prosecutors: "A review of the cases which have concerned the application of the doctrine to law enforcement officers shows that the
great majority of the courts have ruled in favor of the officers."
Of the seven judges, three dissented, one declaring, "[T]he holding
in this case is a major step toward statism." 77
In 1952 the same court seemingly applied the same doctrine
to suits against a sheriff, five deputies, city manager, chief of police,
three police officers, .and their respective sureties, for false arrest,
malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and conspiracy and
trespass. The somewhat unclear opinion was quite clear in asserting: "Peace officers would be reluctant to make arrests for fear that
they would be held liable for having made an honest and reasonable mistake." 78 A dissenting judge argued: "The majority of this
court is, apparently, determined that no action for false arrest,
74 37

Cal. (2d) 727, 235 P. (2d) 209 (1951).
Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Cal. (2d) 854 at 857, 228 P. (2d) 550 (1951).
76 37 Cal. (2d) 727 at 729-730.
11 Id. at 738.
78 Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. (2d) 315 at 321, 239 P. (2d) 876 (1952).
75
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false imprisonment or malicious prosecution shall lie against any
one connected with the enforcement of the law. . . . " 79
By 1955, however, the majority saw the lack of necessity for
going all the way with the immunity doctrine. To protect a police
officer from liability for exercising his judgment does not require
that the officer be immune from liability for a clear violation of a
clear rule. The court set aside a summary judgment for an officer
where the allegation was that the officer made an arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence.80
Then came a case involving a rather clear and serious abuse.81
The officers held the plaintiff in jail three days, stated to reporters
that he was held for suspicion of conspiracy to commit murder
and that he was a member of a criminal gang and a mobster, allowed photographers to take his picture, and then released him
without filing a charge against him. The court of appeals had said:
"To immunize peace officers and other public servants against
claims resulting from errors of judgment while acting in the discharge of duty is now an elementary principle. . . . Not to grant
immunity against civil liability to a peace officer acting within the
scope of his authority for the arrest and detention of a person reasonably suspected of a felony would be to 'place every honest law
enforcement officer under an unbearable handicap and would redound to the detriment of the body politic.' " 82 The Supreme
Court did not deny this principle, but it found it inapplicable.
Proof of the facts alleged, it unanimously held, puts the burden
upon the defendants to show justification for the arrest.
The California court is valiantly trying to work out the problem, with results that seem preferable to a blind following of the
common-law tradition. But the court is unlikely to succeed in its
objective of stamping out police abuses without impairing effective law enforcement, for it lacks the indispensable tool of providing incentives where incentives will have the most effect. Vast
experience proves that police abuses thrive under a system of theoretical legal liability of officers. What is needed is to provide incentives to top officials, not merely to the policemen. If the liability were imposed upon the governmental unit, then the top
officials, who are strongly motivated by threats to their budgets,
79 Id. at 324.
so Miller v. Glass, 44 Cal. (2d) 359, 282 P. (2d) 501 (1955). The clarity of the reasons
for the shift is marred by the court's statement (at p. 362), after referring to malicious
prosecution: "Different principles govern actions for false arrest and imprisonment, for
the law expressly limits the arresting officer's authority."
81 Dragna v. White, 45 Cal. (2d) 469, 289 P. (2d) 428 (1955).
82Dragna v. White, (Cal. App. 1955) 280 P. (2d) 817 at 819.

1956]

OFFICERS' TORT LIABILITY

217

would issue the orders that would be necessary to protect against
tort liability. Policemen do not respond to the largely theoretical
personal liability, which is sporadically imposed and which typically lags years behind the abuse. Policemen do respond to rules
enforced by their superiors, for the enforcement may be steady,
swift, and sure, and the penalties, including dismissal, may be
geared to the practical needs.
A recent Maryland case shows how unsatisfactory the system
of personal liability can be in some circumstances.83 The Baltimore
Commissioner of Police issued a general order that the police
"search for possession of dangerous weapons on all persons coming
under police suspicion." During two months, one hundred and
twenty-nine taverns in one district were entered by the police and
the male patrons "frisked" in a search for concealed weapons. The
plaintiff, an attorney, refused to submit, and he was searched without his consent. He sued the sergeant who was in charge of the
searching squad. The Maryland court deemed itself bound by the
common law that the sergeant was not relieved of liability by
reason of his acting under the orders of his superior. But the court
fixed the damages at one cent. Would an award of substantial
damages have been desirable? Surely something would be wrong
in a system in which a police sergeant would be personally penalized for conscientiously carrying out the orders of his superior.
A policeman should not be required to get legal advice before
following orders. If sanctions are to be effective, they must be applied to those who give the orders, not to those who follow them.
Even when affirmative orders are not given, the sanctions must
be directed to the high officials who know about but do little or
nothing to prevent the abuses.
Personal liability of policemen is a hit-or-miss treatment of
symptoms. The underlying disease can be effectively reached only
by motivating the legislative and executive officers who determine
policies. That can probably be done through a system of tort liability of governmental units. Other states need to study the results
in New York, where state and local governmental units are liable
for such torts as false arrest and false imprisonment.84
Potentialities of surety bonds as a tool for achieving wanted
results are given little heed. If bonds were required under which
sureties were ultimately liable for officers' abuses, not only would
83 Mason v. Wrightson,
84 Bonnau v. State, 278

205 Md. 481, 109 A. (2d) 128 (1954).
App. Div. 181, 104 N.Y.S. (2d) 364 (1951), affd. 303 N.Y. 721,
103 N.E. (2d) 340 (1951); Tierney v. State, 266 App. Div. 434, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 877 (1943),
affd. 292 N.Y. 523, 54 N.E. (2d) 207 (1944).
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injured parties be protected but the companies would be impelled
to prevent the abuses.85 In the line of California cases just reviewed, the one case in which sureties were named as defendants
was a case in which liability was not imposed. 86 The result could
have been different if the sureties had had the ultimate liability.

IV. WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS TORTS
An attitude that has often affected the law of tort liability of
officers was expressed by an English court in 1703: "If publik officers will infringe men's rights, they ought to pay greater damages
than other men, to deter and hinder other officers from like offences. "87 . If ever this attitude is fully justified, it must be when
an officer acts willfully and maliciously in inflicting injury upon
the plaintiff. Yet the law is that officers are often immune from
liability even when they act maliciously. Why?
The reasons must be found in something other than the simple
question of what is justice as between the willful and malicious officer and the innocent plaintiff who has suffered injury. The problem is indeed much more complex. If liability is imposed in one case
in which the evidence clearly shows malice, then later plaintiffs
who are disgruntled by official action may make charges of malice
against conscientious officers, and the result may be that the potentiality of such charges, and of lawsuits based upon them, will
become an extraneous influence upon the determinations that the
officers must make. At all events, this is the essence of the problem.
The foundation for the federal law is a unanimous and clear
decision of the Supreme Court in 1896 in Spalding v. Vilas. 88 The
Court affirmed an order sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's
declaration, even though the defendant Postmaster General was
alleged to have injured the plaintiff "with malicious intent," and
to have made false statements which "were unnecessary, malicious,
and without reasonable or probable cause, and intended to deAn Illinois statute requires the city of Chicago to indemnify policemen for any judgment against them as a result of their official activities, except when the injury results
from their willful misconduct. Ill. Stat. (1955) c. 24, §1-15. From the standpoint of simple
justice as between the city and the policeman who is guilty of willful misconduct, making
the policeman pay a judgment against him is obviously sound.· But from the standpoint
of providing incentives where incentives are needed, in order to minimize willful abuses
by police officers, much can be said for making the city liable even for the willful torts.
85 For an excellent discussion of the successes of surety companies in avoiding liability
on police officers' bonds, see Hall, "The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social
Problems," 3 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 345 (1936).
86 Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. (2d) 315, 239 P. (2d) 876 (1952).
87 Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 at 956, 92 Eng. Rep. 126
(1703).
ss 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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ceive." The Court first found that the Postmaster General's action
was not beyond the scope of his official duties, and then it asked:
"[C]an this action be maintained because of the allegation that
what that officer did was done maliciously?" 89 Relating the problem to that of liability of judges, the Court held: "The motive
that impelled him [the Postmaster General] to do that of which
the plaintiff complains is . . . immaterial."90 The Court succinctly
stated the reason: "In exercising the functions of his office, the
head of an executive department, keeping within the limits of his
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives
that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages." 91
An instructive modern case is Gregoire v. Biddle.92 The plaintiff was imprisoned as an alien enemy for more than four and a
half years, and he sued two successive Attorneys General of the
United States, two successive directors of the enemy alien control
unit of the Department of Justice, and the district director of immigration at Ellis Island, alleging that the defendants "conspired
together and maliciously and wilfully entered into a scheme to
deprive plaintiff . . . of his liberty." The lower court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that defendants had an absolute immunity even if their unlawful acts had been induced only by
personal ill will. The court of appeals held that the complaint
could not stand, even though the court read it to mean that the
defendants "acted altogether from personal spite and had been
fully aware that they had no legal warrant for arresting or deporting the plaintiff." Judge Learned Hand declared for the court:
"The immunity is absolute and is grounded upon principles of
public policy. . . . It does indeed go without saying that an official, :who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen
upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with
the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he
may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried,
and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
89 Id. at 493.
90 Id. at 499.
91 Id. at 498.
92 (2d Cir. 1949)

177 F. (2d) 579.

220

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."93
The Spalding and the Gregoire cases are representative of cases
in the federal courts.94 When the courts regard the functions of
the officers as "discretionary," demurrers or motions to dismiss
are sustained, even though the officers have allegedly acted willfully and maliciously. Plaintiffs are thus denied the opportunity
to prove their allegations. This means that no matter how convincing the evidence of malice may be, the officers are immune.
This result may be basically a failure of the legal system. What
a federal court says-what Judge Learned Hand in the Gregoire
case says-is in effect that the plaintiff must be denied justice as
against the defendant, because doing justice will produce an
unwanted effect in other cases. Must we acquiesce in the melancholy conclusion that we are unable, without unduly sacrificing
other interests, to do justice to a deserving plaintiff who is in fact
the victim of official malice? This question is a truly challenging
one.
The first step is to recognize that such cases as Spalding and
Gregoire almost surely do not involve injustice to the plaintiffs.
93 Id. at 580-581.
94 The cases sustaining

motions to dismiss where malice of the officer is alleged are
numerous. Some of the most important include Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 117 F. (2d)
273, cert. den. 311 U.S. 718 (1941) (Secretary of Interior alleged to have willfully and
maliciously published defamatory statements); Lang v. Wood, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d)
211, cert. den. 302 U.S. 686 (1937) (Attorney General, members of parole board, warden
of prison, and director of prisons alleged to have "maliciously, feloniously, and arbitrarily"
imprisoned plaintiff); Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135 (suit for
malicious prosecution against Comptroller of the Currency; receiver of a national bank,
general counsel of a division of the Treasury Department and general counsel for the
comptroller, deputy comptroller, United States attorney, assistant United States attorney,
and special agent for the FBI, for malicious prosecution; court holds "even the absence
of probable cause and the presence of malice are not sufficient to impose liability upon
such an officer who acts within the general scope of his authority"); Jones v. Kennedy,
(D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. den. 314 U.S. 665 (1941) (conspiracy and malice of
members of SEC); Gibson v. Reynolds, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 95 at 97, cert. den. 337
U.S. 925 (1949) (draft officials; "some officers of government must be and are afforded
personal immunity from civil actions for damages for acts done in relation to matters
committed to them by law although probable cause be absent and malice be present in
their enforcement of the law''); Laughlin v. Rosenman, (D.C. Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 838
(President's confidential assistant, special assistant to the Attorney General, director of
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and warden of penitentiary "all conspiring together"); Taylor
v. Glotfelty, (6th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 51 (psychiatrist at medical center for prisoners);
Baker v. Mueller, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 180 (members of town board, building
inspector, health inspector, city attorney, and plumbing inspector).
For a rather full review of English and American case law before 1926, see the elaborate
opinion in Yaselli v. Goff, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, affirming dismissal of a complaint
in a suit for malicious prosecution against a special assistant to the Attorney General.
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The Court's opinion in Spalding carefully demonstrated that the
Postmaster General was acting within the authority conferred and
was carrying out the congressional intent; despite the theory of
demurrer, the Court clearly did not take literally the allegations
of malice. In the Gregoire case, the reasons for disbelieving the
allegation of malice could not have escaped alert judges; three
times a judge had denied Gregoire habeas corpus, thereby accepting the view of the officers that he was a German. Gregoire was
born in Lorraine when it was a part of Germany but came to the
United States after it had become a part of France. The writ that
finally released Gregoire was affirmed by a court of appeals, one
judge of which revealed that he had previously asserted the view
that one in Gregoire's circumstances should be regarded as a German.95 Even though a reasonable decision, about which judges may_
differ, could conceivably be actuated by malice, Gregoire's allegation seems quite unconvincing.
In most of the cases in which motions to dismiss are granted,
the allegations of malice are only in general terms and may easily
be interpreted to mean no more than that the plaintiff believes
strongly that the officer's determination is erroneous. The problem is to identify the rare case in which official action has truly
been malicious. Can a court do that without the disadvantages of a
trial? The court could treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment96 and could enter judgment for the defendant
unless the plaintiff's affidavit satisfies the court that a trial on the
issue of malice is appropriate, as it would be only in the rare case
in which the charge of malice seems to be justified.
Such a procedure might cut far into Judge Learned Hand's
remark in the Gregoire opinion97 that "it is impossible to know
whether the claim [ of malice] is well founded until the case has
been tried." Something short of trial can show whether the claim
of malice has real substance or whether it is only a vigorous assertion of error.
The next question is whether officials should be forced to submit to the burden of a trial whenever the plaintiff's affidavit is
95 United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, (2d Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 137. An
account of the earlier proceedings is given in the opinion, as well as the previous view
of one of the judges.
96 Under the 1946 amendments to rules 12 (b) and 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a motion to dismiss or a motion f.or judgment on the pleadings may be treated
as a motion for summary judgment. Alternative procedures that might be appropriate
in some cases include interrogatories and discovery.
97 Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579 at 581, cert. den. 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
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found sufficient. Perhaps judges and administrative officers who
perform judicial functions should not be. But the manual worker
who commits a willful tort is and probably should be. personally
liable, and no clear line separates the employee whose functions
are deemed discretionary. Probably the line should be higher on
the scale if the officer acts maliciously than if he acts negligently.
Instead of a sharp line dividing officers who are immune from officers who are not immune, a court might find useful the summary
judgment procedure for officers whose classification is doubtful.
State law of liability of officers for malicious action is probably
essentially in accord with federal, 98 although in an occasional state
case liability is imposed,99 and although the state courts in cases
not involving malice are accustomed to asserting that discretionary
officers are not liable in absence of malice.100
V.

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

The one factor that is most likely to win a suit for damages
against an officer who performs discretionary functions is not malice but excess of jurisdiction. For under the case law, surprisingly
98 Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 193 P. (2d) 461 (1948) (court affirms dismissal of
complaint for wrongful discharge of plaintiffs, though action allegedly taken "wickedly,
maliciously"; court relates problem to immunity of judges); Gottschalk v. Shepperd, 65
N.D. 544, 260 N.W. 573 (1935) (demurrer to complaint sustained, though alleged presi•
dent of state university had personal malice in discharging university professor); Nadeau
v. Marshessault, 112 Vt. 309, 24 A. (2d) 352 (1942) (overseer of poor acts judicially in
administering direct relief; demurrer sustained though malice alleged); Wasserman v.
Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935) (demurrer sustained, though alleged that
officers who revoked building permit were actuated by "their own personal, financial,
political office-holding and election interests"; court declared that an official exercising
discretionary powers "cannot be made personally liable upon an allegation that he acted
maliciously''); Andersen v. Bishop, 304 Mass. 396, 23 N.E. (2d) 1003 (1939) (district
attorney and assistant not liable though malice alleged);' Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa.
188, 88 A. (2d) 892 (1952) (state attorney general immune though malice alleged);
Frazier v. Moffatt, 108 Cal. App. (2d) 379, 239 P. (2d) 123 (1951) (justice of the peace
not liable even if acted maliciously).
·
99 Larson v. Marsh. 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189 (1944) (officers and their bonding
companies liable for failure to indicate plaintiff's home town on primary election ballot,
where duty regarded as ministerial); Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E. (2d)
68 (1952) (liable for failure to place name on primary election ballot); Hedgepeth v.
Swanson, 223 N.C. 442, 27 S.E. (2d) 122 (1943) (error to sustain demurrer alleging sheriff
acted maliciously, where surety named as defendant).
100 Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1 at 7, 68 S.E. (2d) 783 (1952): "The rule in such cases
is that an official may not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or
failure to act, was corrupt or malicious." Galli v. Brown, IIO Cal. App. (2d) 764 at 776,
243 P. (2d) 920 (1952): " ••• not liable when he acts in good faith within the general
scope of his authority, without malice, corruption or sinister motives." Hester v. Miller,
8 N.J. 81 at 84, 83 A. (2d) 773 (1951): "The rule ••• is ·that where there is no fraud
or malice a public officer is exempt from civil action when called upon in behalf of the
public to exercise his discretion."
See also People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E. (2d) 982 (1942);
Tyrell v. Burke, 110 N.J.L. 225, 164 A. 586 (1933); Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C.
15, 8 S.E. (2d) 871 (1940).
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enough, an officer may be liable not only in absence of malice but
even in absence of negligence, if he was mistaken with respect to
facts that may be regarded as jurisdictional. The proposition that
the same officer exercising the same functions may be immune from
liability for malicious action where no jurisdictional mistake is
involved ·but may be subject to liability for a reasonable and nonnegligent mistake as to jurisdiction may seem so incongruous as
to be almost capricious, and yet a good deal of case law supports
this proposition. Such case law rests largely upon historical accident and sterile logic and seems to have little to do with common
sense. At the same time, such case law has not been followed by
the federal courts, and the trend in the state courts may be away
from it.
A leading case is the 1891 Massachusetts decision in Miller v.
H orton,10 1 in which Justice Holmes wrote the opinion. Members
of a board of health found that a horse had glanders and ordered
it destroyed. The statute provided for such action "in all cases of
farcy or glanders." The judge before whom the case was tried
found that the horse did not have glanders. Justice Holmes,
for the court, said that the statute limited the power of the officers
to "a horse that really has the glanders,''102 because "the literal and,
as we think, the true, construction . . . [is] that the authority and
jurisdiction of the commissioners to condemn the plaintiff's horse
under [ the statute] was conditional upon its actually having the
glanders. If this be so, their order would not protect the defendants
in a case where the commissioners acted outside their jurisdiction. ''103
The problem, according to the court's analysis, is the easy one
of reading the statutory words literally and applying those words
to the facts found by the trial judge. The court was apparently
unaware of any problem resulting from the facts that the trial
judge probably did not examine the horse and probably was not
trained in veterinary science, whereas th$! board members may
have examined the horse and may have been trained in veterinary
science. The facts are said to be "really" or "actually" what the
trial judge has found them to be, not what the board has found
them to be, even though the legislative body has put the fact-finding power in the board and not in the judge. The court's only
reason for refusing to interpret the statute to mean that the officers had power to kill a horse they reasonably found to have gland101152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
102 Id. at 542.
103 Id. at 548.
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ers was that the legislative body said" . . . cases of. . glanders."
The court was not wholly unaware of the practical consequences
of requiring the officers to act at their peril, for it expressly rejected
the argument that "few people could be found to carry out orders
on these terms."104
The decision in Miller v. Horton means that an officer may
be completely without fault and still be liable. The officer's action
may be reasonable, prudent, and careful, and the officer still may
be liable for damages if he makes a reasonable mistake. Furthermore, the officer may be personally liable even if his finding that
the horse has glanders is entirely correct, for, in a practical sense,
the test of the officer's liability is not the existence of the disease
but what the court finds afterwards.
Justice Holmes did not mention a prominent Connecticut case
that had been decided just eight years earlier-a case in which the
court was guided by practicalities instead of by wooden literalism
and empty logic. In Raymond v. Fish,10 5 members of the board
of health were held not liable for ordering the destruction of valuable oyster brush, even though they were assumed to be mistaken
in believing that the oyster brush contributed to the spread of
scarlet fever and diphtheria. The statute provided that the board
"shall examine into all nuisances and sources of filth injurious to
the public health, and cause to be removed all filth found within
the to"wn which in their judgment shall endanger the health of the
inhabitants." The court did not reason, as in Miller v. Horton,
that the statute authorized only the examination of "nuisances
and sources of filth" and the removal of "filth" and that the oyster
brush was neither a nuisance nor filth and that therefore the board
acted beyond its jurisdiction. Instead, the court observed that the
object of the statute was to preserve public health: "If the board of
health are to decide at their peril, they will not decide at all. . . .
[D]uty, hampered. by a liability for damages for errors committed
in its discharge, would become a motive of very little power."106
The problem, the court thought, was which decision would best
carry out the basic purpose of protecting the public health. In one
deft sentence, the court escaped the logical trap of whether the
oyster brush "really" or "actually" contributed to the contagious
diseases: "The statute does not mean to destroy property which is
not in fact a nuisance, but who shall decide whether it is so?"107
104 Id.
105 51
106 Id.
107 Id.

at 542.
Conn. 80 (1888).
at 97.
at 96-97.
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The federal courts have generally escaped the logical trap of
the Miller v. Horton doctrine. The Supreme Court has seemingly
understood from an early time that for purposes of tort liability,
a determination of facts affecting jurisdiction is no different from
a determination of any other facts. Thus, in Bradley v. Fisher108
in 1871, the Court declared: "A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is an
usurped authority. . . . But where jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is invested by law in the judge, . . . the manner and extent
in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much
questions for his determination as any other questions . . . ." 109
In 1896 the Court applied the same principle to the Postmaster
General: "As in the case of a judicial officer, we recognize a distinction between action taken by the head of a department in reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less connection with the general
matters committed by law to his control or supervision."110 The
modern attitude of the federal courts is the same and is shown in
the many cases granting motions to dismiss even when malice is
alleged. The proposition that a statute never confers jurisdiction
upon an officer to act maliciously is perfectly logical, but the federal courts are able to look beyond_ logic to practicality.111 For
instance, Judge Learned Hand in the Gregoire opinion112 paid
no heed to the argument that the officers acted "without any authority of law" in imprisoning the plaintiff as an enemy alien.
Since the plaintiff had been judicially determined to be a Frenchman, the officers had no authority to imprison him as an alien
enemy. But the court held that even if the officers "acted altogether from personal spite and had been fully aware that they had
no legal warrant for arresting or deporting the plaintiff,"113 still
1os 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 (1872).
109 Id. at 351-352.
110 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483

at 498 (1896). What may be the most significant
departure from Spalding v. Vilas in the federal courts is a dictum, which apparently has
been without influence in later cases, in North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,
211 U.S. 306 at 316 (1908). The suit was for an injunction, not for damages, concerning
official destruction of unwholesome poultry. The Court declared: "If a party cannot get
his hearing in advance of the seizure and destruction he has the right to have it afterward, which right may be claimed upon the trial in an action brought for the destruction
of his property, and in that action those who destroyed it can only successfully defend if
the jury shall find the fact of unwholesomeness as claimed by them."
111 Nearly all the federal cases cited in the preceding section, dealing with willful
and malicious torts, are here in point.
112 Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579.
113 Id. at 580.
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they were not personally liable. To the argument that the officers,
by reason of personal malice, were necessarily acting beyond the
authority conferred, Judge Learned Hand responded: "A moment's reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning
of the limitation without defeating the whole doctrine. What is
meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his power
cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would
have justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of
the purposes on whose account it was vested in him."114 What a
contrast with the empty logic of Miller v. Horton.
Falling helplessly into the logical trap of Miller v. Horton, the
Mississippi court has picturesquely protested against the position
the federal courts take: "We cannot grasp the conception that nonexistence can be less than nonexistence, or that there can be different kinds of nonexistence, or that that which is absent can be
more absent."116 The court's statement is sound only if it is interpreted literally: the court cannot grasp the conception.
The doctrine of Miller v. Horton is followed in a good many
state decisions116 and it is rejected in a good many.117 The doctrine,
114 Id. at 581.
115 National Surety Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss.
116 A leading case is Lowe v. Conroy, 120

115 at 127, 124 S. 251 (1929).
Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904), expressly
overruling Fath v. Koeppel, 72 Wis. 289, 39 N.W. 539 (1888). But one may wonder
whether the authority of the Fath case is to some extent revived by Wasserman v. Kenosha,
217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935). The Lowe case imposes liability for a reasonable
mistake as to whether a steer had anthrax. The Fath case held an officer not liable for
destruction of fish thought unwholesome, the court saying (at 293) that "a judicial officer
is not responsible in an action for damages . . • however erroneously, negligently, ignorantly, corruptly, or maliciously he may act. •. .'' The Wasserman case held officers
not liable for cancelling a building permit, quoting with approval from the Fath opinion.
Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N.E. 854 (1891), is a prominent case holding officers
liable, although they acted carefully and reasonably in destroying allegedly diseased animals.
In Town of Randolph v. Ketchum, 117 Vt. 468, 94 A. (2d) 410 (1953), an overseer
of the poor was held liable to a neighboring town, on the theory that the overseer
exceeded his authority in taking a poor person to the plaintiff town: "When a public
officer goes outside the scope of his authority or duty, he is not entitled to protection
because of his office, but is liable for his acts like any private individual." Id. at 474.
A member of a police jury who acts pursuant to an unlawful delegation of power
may be personally liable. Strahan v. Fussell, 218 La. 682, 50 S. (2d) 805 (1951). A sheriff
is liable for reasonable mistake in levying on or taking possession of the goods of the
wrong person. Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. 334 (1865); Phillips v. Barker, (Okla. 1954) 269
P. (2d) 337; Choukas v. Severyns, 3 Wash. (2d) 71, 99 P. (2d) 942 (1940); Atlantic
.Finance Corp. v. Galvam, 311 Mass. 49, 39 N.E. (2d) 951 (1942).
117 In addition to Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883), discussed above in this
,section, and the Fath and Wasserman cases of the preceding note, all the holdings of the
federal courts are against liability, as well as such state cases as McGuire v. Amyx, 317
Mo. 1061, 297 S.W. 968 (1927) (health officer not liable for sending healthy person to
pest house, though "jurisdiction"); Wright v. White, 166 Ore. 136, 110 P. (2d) 948 (1941)
(lack of jurisdiction to prosecute without probable cause does not make officer liable);
Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159 at 163, 131 A. 155 (1925) (holding officers not liable for
unlawful dismissal, court declares principle: "When the officer makes an erroneous
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for some unexplained and probably unexplainable reason, has a
somewhat stronger application to property rights than to personal
rights. For instance, even though a plaintiff who is wrongfully
quarantined may be more seriously damaged than one whose
property is wrongfully destroyed, under the case law he is less
likely to recover damages from the officer.118 In what may be the
most extreme application of the doctrine, the Massachusetts court
holds that officers act beyond their jurisdiction and therefore become personally liable if their only fault is failure to comply with
a procedural requirement: "The full performance of all conditions
established by the statute are essential prerequisites to the jurisdiction of the municipal council over the subject-matter of the
removal of an officer.... The municipal council was clothed with
the power of removal of city officers so long as there was conformity
to the requirements of the law. When the members ceased to
comply with the law they were acting outside their official capacity
and were subjected to responsibility as individuals."119
If the law on liability of officers for acting in excess of jurisdiction is somewhat unsatisfactory,120 the difficulty lies largely in the
principle of sovereign irresponsibility. A court that is compelled
to choose between letting an innocent plaintiff bear the loss from
improper destruction of his property and imposing liability upon
an innocent officer who has made a reasonable mistake is sure to
make an undesirable decision no matter which way it holds, for
no solution can be just to both parties, except the obvious solution
of allowing the loss to be borne by the public, which gets the benefit of the program the officer is administering and should therefore
pay for the mistakes that are normal, natural, and expected.
preliminary decision that he has jurisdiction, and then acts in pursuance of the error,
liability depends upon his right to pass upon the jurisdictional question. If he goes out•
side his general authority, he is not protected for the consequences of his action. If
within his general authority his erroneous exercise of it is due to special reasons of
jurisdictional invalidity, he is protected.'')
Even in Massachusetts, a mayor has been held not liable for damages for denying an
application for a license. Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110 (1932).
118 Holding officers not liable for wrongful quarantine: Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N.Y.
493, 116 N.E. 355 (1917); Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa 244, 108 N.W. 311 (1906).
But compare Barry v. Smith, 191 Mass. 78, 77 N.E. 1099 (1906).
119 Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174 at 183, 123 N.E. 615 (1919).
See the rather full discussion of Massachusetts cases in the opinion. A later case to somewhat the same effect, though less extreme, is Forbes v. Kane, 316 Mass. 207, 55 N.E. (2d)
220 (1944).
120 The congeries of rules concerning liability of officers take on an additional flavor
of artificiality and arbitrariness when they are put into the format of a Restatement.
The rules seem far from consistent. See TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §§12li, 202e, 204e, 262, 265,
269, 271, 275, 278b, 601, 645, 656, 888, and 890f (1934-1939). The supplements of 1948
and 1954 show no change and hardly any citation of these provisions by the courts.
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ACT

Because law normally develops in a rather plodding fashion,
only occasionally can .one discern in a whole body of cases a clash
of ideas or doctrine that partakes of the dramatic. A rather exciting legal drama is the story since 1944 of the rise and partial
decline of the Civil Rights Act of I 871 as a basis for recovering
damages against state officers. At one time-about_ 1950-the
traditional immunity of officers seemed to be crumbling at an
alarming rate, whether the officers exercised legislative, judicial,
executive, or administrative power. The villain in the drama was
the drastic language of the act, which had been designed in 1871
to resolve post-Civil War problems. But the heroes of the story,
the federal judges, resorted to their powerful weapon of creative
law-making through interpretation, and finally triumphed. The
statute, which the Supreme Court has characterized as "loosely
and blindly drafted in the first instance,"121 has succumbed to
strong interpretation that rests upon little but practical judgment
about practical needs.
The Civil Rights Act, in its main provision concerning civil
liability, provides: "Every person who, under color of_ any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."122
Other provisions created civil liability for denial ~f equal protection,123 and created criminal liability for designated willful action.124
The modern expansion of civil liability of officers began in
1944 in Snowden v. Hughes125 in which the Supreme Court dismissed a complaint brought against officers but nevertheless
breathed life into the Act of 1871, which had been largely dormant
during the twentieth century. The following year in the Picking
case126 the Third Circuit, taking its cue from the Snowden opin121 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 at 121 (1951).
122 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983.
123 42 u.s.c. (1952) §1985.
12442 U.S.C. (1952) §§1987 and 1988.
125 321 U.S. 1 (1944). The cases involving civil liability have interacted with cases
involving criminal liability. Outstanding cases on criminal liability under the act are
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951);
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
126 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240.
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ions, succumbed completely to the literal words of the act, holding
various officers personally liable, including not only the Governor
of Pennsylvania but also a justice of the peace. The court sensationally departed from all previous Anglo-American tradition in
holding: "If the plaintiffs brought a proper proceeding to secure
their liberty before Justice of the Peace Keiffer and he refused
to hear their cause, he may be answerable to the plaintiffs in
damages."127 A judicial officer may be personally liable for making a judicial determination!
In 1946 Judge Learned Hand was unable to resist the literal
words of the act, as interpreted in the Snowden and Picking opinions.128 The suit was against various officers of New York Citythe Board of Standards and Appeals, the Department of Housing
and Building, the Commissioner of Buildings, the Borough Superintendent, the chief engineer, and two examiners of the Building
Department. Despite the clarity of federal law in recognizing the
immunity of such officers apart from the act, the court said: "Whatever may have been true before, it seems to us that, since the
decision of the Supreme Court in Snowden v. Hughes, ... such
allegations [ deliberate abuse of statutory power] will support an
action. . . ." 129 The court indicated that it was aware of the extreme consequences of its decision: "So far as we can see, any
public officer of a state ... will have to defend any action brought
[ under the act] in which the plaintiff, however irresponsible, is
willing to make the necessary allegations."130
Then came many cases rejecting the immunity of judicial,
administrative, and legislative officers. For instance, the Sixth
Circuit reversed a dismissal of a complaint in a suit against a justice
of the peace,131 the Second Circuit reversed a dismissal of a complaint in a suit by a teacher against a school principal alleging
wrongful discharge,132 and the Ninth Circuit reversed a dismissal
of a complaint against members of a state legislative investigating
committee.133 Personal liability of officers of all kinds was growing
rapidly.
At this point, the Supreme Court decided to use its power to
change the direction of law development. In Tenney v. Brand121 Id. at 250.
128 Burt v. City of
120 Id. at 791-792.

New York, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 791.

1so Id. at 793.

131 McShane v. Moldovan, (6th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 1016.
132 Bomar v. Keyes, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 136.
133 Brandhove v. Tenney, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 121, revd.

See discussion of the Supreme Court decision immediately below.

341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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hove,134 it reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit that legislators could be personally liable: "We think it is clear that the
legislation on which this action is founded does not impose liability on the facts before us, once they are related to the presuppositions of our political history. " 185 The Court traced the history
of immunity of legislators, from 1523, through the colonial period,
to modern times, to show "the tradition of legislative freedom."
The Court said it would be "a big assumption" to assume that
Congress has constitutiona~ power to limit the freedom of state
legislators acting within their traditional sphere. Without discussing the plain meaning of the statute, the Court declared: "We
cannot believe that Congress - itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded
in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language
before us."186 As to the allegation of unworthy purpose of the
legislators, the Court generalized: "Legislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty,
not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One
must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the
cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives."187
The opinion in the Tenney case was carefully limited to the
issue before the Court - the immunity of legislators. But both
of the major reasons given, the tradition of immunity and the
need for uninhibited discharge of duty, are fully applicable to
judicial, executive, and administrative officers. The tradition of
judicial immunity is probably more deeply embedded than the
tradition of legislative immunity; the tradition of immunity for
administrative officers is much less impressive but is nevertheless
reasonably clear, especially for officers exercising judicial or legislative powers.
On the basis of the Tenney opinion, the lower courts were
emboldened to hold that judicial officers were immune from
liability, despite the clarity of the act's words.188 Even the Third
184 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
185 Id. at 372.
186 Id. at 376.
137 Id. at 377.
188 Tate v. Arnold, (8th

Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 782 (justice of the peace immune);
Francis v. Crafts, (1st Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 809, cert. den. 346 U.S. 835 (1953); Grubbs
v. Slater, (W.D. Ky. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 110; United States ex rel. Peters v. Carson, (W.D.
Pa. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 137; Souther v. Reid, (E.D. Va. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 806; Morgan
v. Sylvester, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 380.
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Circuit, which had denied immunity for a justice of the peace,1 39
held that the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was not liable, although it refrained from determining whether
its earlier holding was overruled.140
Immunity of legislators and judges was thus restored; immunity of administrative officers was the remaining problem. In
1953 the First Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint by
school teachers against a mayor and members of a board of aldermen and common council, alleging that the officers had abrogated
contract obligations.141 Surprisingly, Judge Magruder said in a
concurring opinion: "I think that members of a city council would
be liable in damages for pecuniary harm to a plaintiff intentionally inflicted by action, under color of official authority, which
the defendants subjectively realized would result in depriving the
plaintiff of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution."142
Judge Woodbury's dissent was not based upon immunity but upon
interpretation of the complaint. The First Circuit, however,
straightened itself out the following year in a masterful opinion
by Judge Magruder in Francis v. Lyman.143 The opinion in all
probability embodies the law of the future. The court said that
"we think it no longer appropriate" to "give effect to the statute
in its literal wording."144 Instead, the court should "fit the statute
as harmoniously as may be into the familiar and generally accepted
legal background, and to confine its application, within reason, to
those situations which might possibly have had the approval of
the Congress if it had specifically adverted to the particular cases.
145
• • •"
The court said that in cases involving discrimination on
grounds of color and other problems of major concern to the Reconstruction Congress, state officials even act at their peril, and "it
139 Picking v. Pennsylvania R.
140 Ginsburg v. Stem, (3d Cir.

Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240.
1955) 225 F. (2d) 245: "We refrain expressly, however,
from any determination as to whether the Picking decision has been overruled by the
Supreme Court ••• by Tenney v. Brandhove."
141 Cobb v. City of Malden, (1st Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 701.
142 Id. at 707. Contrast the many cases discussed above in Part IV, in which com•
plaints were dismissed alleging malice, including, for instance, Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d
Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579. For application of the principle of the Gregoire case to municipal officers even further down the scale than members of a city council, see Baker v.
Mueller, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 180, involving members of a town board, building
inspector, health inspector, city attorney, and plumbing inspector.
In a later case, Dunn v. Gazzola, (1st Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 709, Judge Magruder
wrote the opinion affirming a dismissal of a complaint against a sergeant of police and
chief of police, alleging conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of equal protection; the ground
was that the bare conclusionary allegation could not protect the complaint from the
motion to dismiss.
143 (1st Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 583.
144 Id. at 587.
145 Id. at 587.
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is no defense .._. that they may have acted, not maliciously, but
in the good-faith belief that they were performing their official
duty · under what they thought was valid state legislation. . . .
But beyond such situations, it seems to be the tendency of the
decisions to restrict the applications of the Civil Rights Act so as
to avoid the appalling inflammation of delicate state-federal relationships which undoubtedly would ensue."146
The specific holding was nothing more than that superintendents of two institutions, acting pursuant to court order, were not
liable for false imprisonment.147 The importance of the case lies
in the broad approach, including a passage quoted from an earlier
opinion of Judge Magruder, that "the Act merely expresses a prima
facie liability, leaving to the courts to work out, from ~se to case,
the defenses by way of official privilege which might be appropriate
to the particular case."148
This approach, of course, leads to the judicial reinvention of
law of official immunity, along the lines of what the courts have
already invented apart from the Civil Rights Act.
Under such an approach, members of a city police department
may be liable, a;, held in the Seventh Circuit.149 A sheriff and
deputy sheriff may be liable for an illegal search and seizure, as
held by the Fifth Circuit.160 And a court is likely to have doubt
and difficulty with the problem of whether a state's attorney should
be held liable for acquiescence in use of force by lesser officers;
on this question the Seventh Circuit holds for immunity and the
Fifth Circuit for liability.101
Perhaps the law of the future under the Civil Rights Act will
be the same as the law apart from the act, except where problems
are involved of the type that were the special concern of the Reconstruction Congress.

VII.

PERSPECTIVE AND CONCLUSIONS

What the law of tort liability of public officers and employees
most needs is an expansion of tort liability of governmental units.
If the particular governmental unit is liable for the tort, so that
the loss will thus be properly spread, then the courts will be re146 Id. at 588.
147 The court

reasoned that the two superintendents could not be liable for acting
pursuant to court order, for the legislators who enacted the statute were not liable, and
the judge who issued the warrant of commitment was not liable.
148 Cobb v. City of Malden, (1st Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 701 at 706.
149 Geach v. Moynahan, (7th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 714.
150 Davis v. Turner, (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 847.
151 Cawley v. Warren, (7th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 74; Lewis v. Brautigan, (5th Cir.
1955) 227 F. (2d) 124.
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lieved from the heed for choosing between leaving a deserving
plaintiff without remedy and imposing liability upon the individual officer or employee, who is usually either ill-equipped to
bear the loss or is performing the type of function that can be
properly performed only if the officer is free from the need of
considering his own pocket book. The public interest in fearless
administration usually should come first, so that officers must be
immune from liability even when the plaintiff asserts that the
officers have acted maliciously; when this is so, the only proper
way to compensate deserving plaintiffs is to impose liability on
the governmental unit. When the public gets the benefit of a
program, the public should pay for the torts that may be expected
in carrying out the program. The only satisfactory solution of
many problems about liability· of officers and employees is to
compensate the plaintiff but to hold the officer or employee immune.
The great body of federal and state law which recognizes the
central principle that officers exercising discretionary power are
immune from liability for unintentional torts and even for those
which are allegedly malicious seems generally satisfactory,152 and
the scattered state cases that do not recognize this principle probably should do so. If this principle means that justice is denied
to deserving plaintiffs, the cure should be to impose liability on
the governmental unit. The only weakness in this broad conclusion lies in· its application to a case in which the plaintiff can
'prove that the officer did in fact act maliciously, willfully, or
corruptly; in such a case, a revulsion to officer immunity is natural
and sound, except for the harm that may be caused to the many
conscientious officers by imposing liability on the guilty officer.
Conceivably, procedural means can be invented (such as affidavits
and motions for summary judgment) to allow imposition of liability on the officer in an appropriate case and still protect other
officers from the necessity of trial to prove absence of malice or
willfulness; such a solution may be desirable especially when the
152 This conclusion is drastically in disagreement with the conclusion of Jennings,
"Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 MINN. L. R.Ev. 263 (1937). Professor Jennings concluded that when officers determine issues with or without hearings or other
procedural safeguards, the test of their liability should be "whether they acted beyond
the bounds of reasonable official action" (p. 309), and "whether they had acted in the
circumstances as reasonable men would have acted." (p. 312) These two tests seem to
be the same. Both are out of line with the case law, for if the Jennings test were followed,
officers would often be liable for unintentional torts, and motions to dismiss would have
to be denied whenever malice is properly alleged. The cases are overwhelming that the
effective test for liability of officers exercising high discretionary powers is not reasonableness of the officers' determinations, and policy reasons seem strongly to support the cases.
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functions performed involve a larger proportion •of the ministerial
and a lesser proportion of the so-called discretionary. Complete
immunity of officers performing legislative or judicial duties
should probably be continued-even when malice can be proved.
The common-law tradition that a servant is liable for his own
torts committed in the course of employment and that he must
indemnify the master for any loss resulting from unin~entional
fault of the servant is contrary to the realities of both corporate
employment and government employment. The Supreme Court
has unanimously brought federal law into accord with the realities,
and other courts may well follow the Supreme Court's lead in
departing from the common-law tradition.
The common-law tradition that a servant is liable for his own
and related torts has been recently reexamined in some thoughtful
state court opinions, with the result that policemen may be immune from liability when they have acted in good faith. The only
satisfactory solution of the problem of police abuses is likely to
be imposition of liability 'upon the governmental unit, thereby
providing to executive and legislative officers the needed incentive
for effective discipline of policemen.
Various state courts have developed confused doctrine in
trying to distinguish jurisdictional questions from other questions.
The unfortunate result, following Miller v. Horton,1 53 is to hold
officers personally liable for reasonable mistakes even in absence
of fault. Federal courts from an early time have been quite clear
that officers should be immune from liability so long as their·
action is not "manifestly or palpably beyond . . . authority."154
From a practical standpoint, the federal law is superior to the law
of the state courts that adhere to the doctrine of Miller v. Horton.
Since 1944, literal interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 has induced many federal courts to impose ·liability upon
officers in many circumstances in which they would otherwise be
immune, but beginning with the Supreme Court's 1951 decision
in Tenney v. Brandhove,155 literal interpretation has declined
drastically. Officers in the future are likely seldom to be held
liable under the act unless they would be liable apart from the
act or unless their action involves subject matter of the kind that
the Reconstruction Congress may have had specially in mind.
U3 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
154 Quoted from Spalding v. Vilas, 161
llill Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367

U.S. 483 at 498 (1896).
(1951).

